This paper proposes a novel one-time password (OTP) mutual authentication scheme based on challenge/response mechanisms. In the scheme, random sub-passwords and corresponding hashes are shared between a user and a server, respectively. By performing modular algebraic operations on two or more randomly chosen sub-passwords, relatively independent OTPs can be produced in the scheme. The used sub-passwords are renewed according to random permutation functions. With tens of random sub-passwords, we can get enough OTPs that can meet the practical needs. The stores and calculations can be implemented with a microcomputer in the user's terminal. At the same time, the scheme can provide sufficient security in ordinary applications.
Introduction
With the development of the computer and the Internet, various types of electronic communications and transactions appear, such as online banking, online money transfers and online trading. Today, they have become an essential part of our lives. However, almost all of them are operated over insecure networks. Such insecure networks may be intrusioned by hackers and other unauthorized users. This may lead legitimate users to disclose their private information or lose their properties.
Many popular authentication methods are often used to improve the security of communications over insecure networks, such as passwords, digital signatures, smart cards, and fingerprints. Among these methods, the password authentication is regarded as the simplest and most convenient one [1] . The password is a secret word, or string of characters that is used for authentication. The conventional static passwords are quite common for very low-cost provision and no need for the user to carry another device. However, they are prone to password-guessing attacks, because the user often select the password so that it can be easily memorized [2] . They are also in the threats of disclosure and line eavesdropping, both of which allow subsequent replay [3] . To overcome this problem, Lamport initially proposed a one-time password (OTP) authentication scheme using hash functions [4] . Such passwords are used only once and then thrown away. Later, Haller refined it to the S/KEY standard [5] . Subsequently, many other OTP authentication schemes have been proposed to improve the security, reduce the cost or increase efficiency [2, [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Generally, these schemes generate a new password either based on the previous one using a mathematical algorithm, or based on time/sequence synchronization, or based on a challenge and a counter again using a mathematical algorithm [10] , where a typical mathematical algorithm is a hash function algorithm. However, some practical difficulties may exist in these schemes, such as the high hash overhead, the need of time/sequence synchronization, the necessity for password resetting, and the dependence among OTPs.
Considering the above difficulties in these OTP authentication schemes, we propose a novel OTP mutual authentication scheme. In our scheme, with performing modular algebraic operations on two or more randomly chosen sub-passwords from tens of random sub-passwords, one can easily produce relatively independent OTPs. At the same time, the scheme can give sufficient security to protect the personal information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the related notations and basic concepts. In Section 3, we introduce the related work. In Section 4, we present our OTP mutual authentication scheme. In Section 5, we show the BAN logic analysis for our protocol. In Section 6, we discuss the properties of produced OTPs and analyze the security of the scheme. In Section 7, we compare our scheme with others. At last, in Section 8 we draw a conclusion about the scheme.
Notations and basic concepts

Notations
For simplicity, frequently used notations and the corresponding descriptions are listed below.
S:
t h e s e r v e r , t h e t o t a l n u m b e r o f a l l π m (·),
x Asends x to B through a secure channel,
x Asends x to B through a common channel.
Basic concepts
Our proposed scheme will employ two basic concepts, i.e., one-way hash functions and random permutation functions. In the following, we briefly describe them, respectively.
One-way hash function
A one-way hash function h = h(x) is an algorithm which maps messages x into a fixed string of digits, usually for security or data management purposes. It usually has three properties [11] . The first main property is one-wayness. Given x, it easily to compute a hash value h(x), but given a hash value h(x), it is very difficult to find the message x. The second property is that the output will not give any information even part of the input. The third property is collision resistant, i.e., it is hard to find two messages x 1 = x 2 with H(x 1 ) = H(x 2 ). There are many algorithms for one-way hash functions, such as Message Digests (MD4, MD5), Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512). As known to all, hash functions may be used with or without a key. If a key is used, both symmetric (single secret key) and asymmetric keys (public/private key pairs) may be used. A naive method to hash the message x with a key is h(KEY, x) [11] .
Random permutation function
A permutation function π on N is a bijection from N to itself, i.e., π(N → N): j = π(i), i, j ∈ N [3] . A random permutation can produce a random ordering sequence for an original sequence S N 0 . One method of generating a random permutation for the sequence S N 0 is to generate a sequence by taking a random number between 1 and N sequentially, ensuring that there is no repetition. For example for the original sequence S 5 0 , if π(1) = 3, π(2) = 5, π(3) = 1, π(4) = 2, π(5) = 4, a random ordering sequence S = (3, 5, 1, 2, 4) is obtained with the permutation function π .
Related work
The hash and the random permutation functions are two important encryption functions in modern cryptography [3, 11] . Since the two functions are easy to calculate, they are often used in various cryptographic constructs, such as data encryption and digital signatures. Hash functions have been extensively used to generate OPTs [4] [5] [6] [7] . Random permutation functions also been used in various protocols. For example, Shamir proposed a zero-knowledge identification protocol [12] . Wong et al. introduced a password-keyed permutation family to capture the features of the password related operations in a password authenticated key exchange scheme [13] . Recently, with a random permutation function, Catuogno and Galdi proposed and evaluated the security of a two-factor graphical password scheme [14] .
On the other hand, some strong authentication protocols have used challenge/response mechanisms [15] , in which one party presents a question (challenge) and the other party must provide a valid answer (response) to be authenticated [3, 16] . The mechanism is often used in OTP schemes [4] [5] [6] [7] . Using the mechanism, it can easily implement mutual authentication between U and S.
In detail, we will review three typical OTP schemes. The first one is Lamport's Scheme [4] . In the scheme, a hash chain,
, is formed as a hash function h(·) is applied for ℵ times to a secret key w.
In the tth time authentication, the server S sends a challenge ℵ − t to the user U . Then U calculates the tth time OTP
using a microcomputer and sends it to S as a response. The identify of U is authenticated by S with checking
OTP is already saved in S side at the t − 1th authentication. After a successful authentication, both S and U increase t by one. However, it is vulnerable to the small challenge attack [17] . The second one is Yeh-Shen-Hwang's Scheme [6] , which is composed of Registration phase, Login phase and Authentication phase. In Registration phase, S issues a smart card to U . The card contains a pre-shared secret w, a large random number ℵ (a permitted number of login times), w ⊕ D 0 , and H(D 0 ), where D 0 is a random number. Once receiving them, U can extract D 0 by performing XOR operation on w ⊕ D 0 and D 0 . D 0 is hashed one time and compared with the H(D 0 ). The identity of S is authenticated if they are same. Then U computes the initial password
Similarly as that in Registration phase, the identify of S can be authenticated by U . Then U → S: p t ⊕ D t , i.e., S responses S with p t ⊕ D t ; In Authentication phase, S can obtains p t by performing the XOR operation on p t ⊕ D t and D t . Then p t is hashed one time and compared with p t−1 . If they are same, the identity of U is authenticated by S. After the successful authentication, S and U replace p t−1 and C t−1 with p t and C t , respectively. However, it is vulnerable to the stolen-verifier attack [18] .
The third one is Eldefrawy et al.'s Scheme [7] using nested hash chains. There are two phases, which are Registration phase, and Login and Authentication phase. In Registration phase, U and S share w OTP
where w OTP 0 and w Auth 0 are the OTP seed and the authentication seed, respectively. U stores them in his token. In Login and Authentication phase,
2t−1 at last authentication. The identify of S can be authenticated by U with positive results. After the successful au-
). If the two results are positive, the identify of U can be authenticated by S. After the successful authentication, U and S update w Auth
Our proposed scheme
In this section, we will describe our scheme first. Then, we will give an example to illustrate the scheme.
The scheme
There are three phases in our scheme, i.e., the Registration phase, the Login/Authentication phase and the Sub-password change phase. The Registration phase is performed only once, and the Login/Authentication phase is executed every time a user logs into the system. The Sub-password change phase is invoked after every login request is accepted.
Registration phase
In this phase, everyone who wants to register at the server should have a microcomputer. U can freely select or change his/her personal identification number (PIN) for the microcomputer.
(1) U freely chooses his/her ID and P st , then U ⇒ S: ID and P .
(2) Upon receiving the registration request, S checks whether there exists the same ID. If the ID has been registered, S asks U to choose his/her ID again until the chosen ID is unique. (4) S generates a random permutation function Π for an original sequence S N 0 with a physical random number source, which gives the mappings n = Π(n). S stores the random permutation function Π and P s n , where n = 1, 2, . . . , N.
(5) S generates different random permutation functions π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π m , . . . , π M for an original sequence S K 0 with physical random numbers sources, which gives the mappings k = π m (k). S ⇒ U : π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π K . S and U store π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π K , respectively.
Login/Authentication phase
In this phase, U has to send a login request message to S whenever U wants to log in.
(1) U keys PIN on his/her microcomputer.
(2) U generates the pseudorandom integer sequence nonce = (n 1 , n 2 , . . . ,n m , . . . ,n M ) based on a mathematical algorithm using his/her microcomputer [19] , where 1 n m N. U calculates Z = M m=1 P s n m mod K , and gets P o u = h(KEY, Z ). 
Sub-password change phase
After every login request is accepted, S and U change their sub-passwords, respectively.
For U :
(1) According to nonce = (n 1 , n 2 , . . . ,n m , . . . ,n M ) and (3) S increases his counter value T u by one after the successful authentication.
For S: S renews his/her sub-passwords similarly as that for U . At the same time, S increases his counter value T s by one after the successful authentication.
Counter resynchronization:
Some reasons will lead to T u = T s . For example, U forgets to employ Sub-password change phase, U employ it consecutive twice, or S cannot successfully transport the message that "the login request is accepted" to U . The three steps that U does are reversible, therefore with the knowledgement about a few last (nonce, P o u ) and ( nonce, p o u ), U can make T u = T s .
An example
To make the idea concise and clear, we illustrate our scheme in Fig. 1 . It shows that for U , the OTPs P o u and p o u are generated from sub-passwords P s 1 , P s 2 , . . . , P s N based on challenge values nonce and nonce, respectively. The sub-passwords P s 1 , P s 2 , . . . , P s N dynamically change based on nonce and nonce after every successful authentication. For S, it is similar as that for U . The hash functions, random permutation functions and modular algebraic operations are also used. They server as secrets between U and S. The mutual authentication is achieved in our scheme. We provide a numeric example to demonstrate how to generate OTPs in our scheme. In practice, we use the HMAC-MD5 algorithm to calculate hash value and we denote h (KEY, Z ) to it. Then we choose certain bits from it to get the OTP.
Assume that the sub-password P s n is made of 10 digit characters, i.e., 0-9. The password lengths L = 6. We choose that N = 5, M = 2, K = 9, KEY = 426310, π 1 = (7, 2, 1, 5, 3, 8, 6, 0, 9, 4) and π 2 = (4, 0, 7, 3, 1, 6, 8, 2, 5, 9) . 
BAN logic analysis of our protocol
It is well known that BAN logic [20] is a popular method to analyze authentication protocols [21, 22] , which provides a formal method of reasoning the beliefs of participant in a security protocol. In the section, we will prove the security of our protocol with it.
BAN logical notation
BAN logical notation used in our paper as follows:
• P | ≡ X : P believes in X ; • P X : someone has sent P a message containing X ; • P | ∼ X : P sent a message containing X and, by the time P sent it, P believed in it; • (X): X has not been sent any time before the current run of the protocol. Usually, X is a nonce;
• P K ↔ Q : K is a good key for P and Q to communicate;
• P X ↔ Q : X is a shared secret known only to P and Q ; • {X} K : X encrypted with key K . Note that encryption is idealized in the sense that algebraic properties of different cryptosystems are not considered;
• X Y : X combined with Y so that Y 's presence proves the identity of whoever uttered X .
Original protocol
From Section 4 and Fig. 1 , the message sequence in Login/Authentication phase are as follows: In Message 1, U sends ID, P st and nonce to S stating a login request. The nonce is a sequence random number. U challenges S with nonce. And S responds U with P o s in the second message according to their shared secrets, i.e., sub-passwords based on received nonce. At the same time, in Message 2, S sends a challenge value nonce to U , and U responds with P o u in the third message according to their shared sub-passwords.
Idealized protocol
To express our protocol in standard notation, we use A and B to represent U and S, respectively. We use Y st , N a and N b to represent P st , nonce and nonce, respectively. We also use K ab and K ab to represent the algorithm of obtaining OTPs, shared sub-passwords, hash functions, modular algebraic operation, and random permutation functions, which act as shared keys between U and S. The corresponding {N a } K ab and {N b } K ab represent P o s and P o u , respectively. The cleartext ID is omitted as they do not contribute to the logical properties of our protocol. The idealized protocol is as follows:
Security goals
The protocol is intended to provide a means for a user A and a server B to authenticate with each other using challenge/response mechanisms. That is:
G1 means that B believes the challenge N a from A, and B responses A with {N a } K ab . In other words, A believes that B believes the N a , i.e., G2. The meanings of G3 and G4 are similar as that for G1 and G2, respectively.
Initiative assumptions
To analyze our protocol, we first give the following assumptions: 
A4: B | ≡
A K ab ↔ B; A5: A | ≡ A K ab ↔ B; A6: B | ≡ A K ab ↔ B; A7: A | ≡ (N a ); A8: B | ≡ (N b ).
Protocol analysis
We now proceed with the analysis.
• A2 gives that B | ≡ A Y st ↔ B and M1 means that B N a Y st . We apply them on the message-meaning rule for shared secretes [20, 21] that
, and then obtain the belief G1 : B | ≡ A | ∼ N a .
• A3 gives that A | ≡ A K ab ↔ B and M2 means that A {N a } K ab . We apply them on the message-meaning rule for shared keys [20, 21] that
, and then get the result that A | ≡ B | ∼ N a . At the same time, A7 gives the result that A | ≡ (N a ). We apply the two results on the nonce-verification rule [20, 21] that P | ≡ (X),P | ≡ Q | ∼ X P | ≡ Q | ≡ X , and then obtain the belief G2 : A | ≡ B | ≡ N a . • A7 also means A | ≡ N a , and A 3 also means A | ≡ K ab . We apply the belief-concatenation rule [20, 21] and obtain A | ≡ {N a } K ab . M2 means that B | ≡ {N a } K ab . Therefore {N a } K ab can be as a shared secret known only to A and B. Then similarly as that in the above, the beliefs G3 : A | ≡ B | ∼ N b and G4 : B | ≡ A | ≡ N b can also be obtained.
Discussion and security analysis
The sub-password P s n = (C 1 n , C 2 n , . . . , C l n , . . . , C L n ) is made of characters, which are from certain groups, e.g., 10 digit characters (0-9), 26 low case alphabet characters (a − z), 26 upper case alphabet characters (A − Z ) [23] . The total number of possible characters of sub-passwords K depends on the chosen character groups, which may be equal to 36, 62 or others. In practice [24] , most password lengths L are in the range [6, 10] , therefore, L ∈ [6, 10] is recommended. Based on nonce = (n 1 , n 2 , . . . ,n m , . . . ,n M ), M sub-passwords are randomly chosen from all N sub-passwords to produce a OTP P o u and a OTP P o s . In the following, we present the simulated results for the scheme proposed in Section 4. We suppose P o t = (C 1 t , C 2 t , . . . , C l t , . . . , C L t ) is the tth time OTP, where t = 1, 2, . . . , T . We choose C l t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 9, a, . . . , z}, i.e., K = 36. The condition that L = 8, M = 4 and T = 10 6 is as an example. Let us first consider the probability distribution function
is the occur time that C l t+1 = C b and C l t = C a for all T OTPs, the probability distribution function
If the OTPs is completely random, for infinite OTPs, P (C b , C a ) = 1 1296 at K = 36. Fig. 2 shows the variations of P (C b , C a ) with C b at C a = 9 for N = 5, 10, 50 and 100, respectively. For other C a , the results are similar. For comparison, the figure also gives P (C b , C a ) for randomly-produced OTPs, in which C l t is randomly chosen from the character set {0, 1, . . . , 9, a, . . . , z}. The line in the figure is for the function P (C b , C a ) = 1 36 . We find all P (C b , C a ) fluctuate near the value 1 36 . The large N, 
where the bracket denotes average over all possible t. Fig. 3 shows the variations of C ( t) with t at for N = 5, 10, 50, 100 and for randomly-produced OTPs, respectively. We find C ( t) are very small and fluctuate near zero for all t. Therefore, from the properties of P (C b , C a ) and C ( t), we find there are almost no correlations between OTPs. With tens of random sub-passwords, we can get almost random OTPs.
On the other hand, in our scheme, it performs simple modular algebraic operations and only needs one time hash operation to produce OTPs, which makes the calculation cost low. The counter synchronization is easily operated by U . In our simulations, we generate 10 6 OTPs and do not find a repeater, which means that we needn't reset the original conditions of U and S.
As each password is used only once, our scheme is safe from passive adversaries who eavesdrop and later attempt impersonation [3] , i.e., Eavesdropping Attack and Replay Attack. At the same time, our scheme has most predominant security properties [2] . For examples, we apply random permutation functions to renew sub-passwords, the produced OTPs are almost completely random, therefore our scheme is resistance to Password Guessing Attacks. We propose the mutual authentication here, so it is resistance to Masquerade/Impersonation Attack/Forgery Attack. The order of sub-passwords for S is different from that for U , hash functions are used and sub-passwords will be renewed after every successful authentication, therefore it is resistance to Stolen-Verifier Attacks. In our scheme, U should click a PIN code to his/her microcomputer, at some time U can intentionally make his/her microcomputer lose synchronization and operates it synchronization when he/she uses it, and U should send a static password to S, thus the scheme can resist Microcomputer Lost Attack. There is no correlation between OTPs, so it can resist Small Challenge Attack. The keyed hash functions and the random permutation functions are used and they can be taken as the non-repudiation evidence.
Comparisons
The comparisons of our scheme and three related schemes [4, 6, 7] are summarized in Table 1 . The corresponding three schemes have been reviewed in Section 3. Table 1 shows that devices are needed and challenge/response mechanisms are used in all the four schemes. Except Lamport's Scheme, Mutual authentication is used in the other three schemes. Password resetting is necessary in Lamport's Scheme and Yeh-Shen-Hwang's Scheme, but it is not in Eldefrawy et al.'s Scheme and our scheme. Comparing with other three schemes, the hash cost and the dependence among OTPs are very low in our scheme.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a robust and efficient OTP mutual authentication scheme based on challenge/response mechanisms. With tens of shared random sub-passwords, OTPs are produced. The sub-passwords and corresponding hash functions with a key are stored in U and S, respectively. These sub-passwords that randomly chosen to produce OTPs are renewed according to random permutation functions. With the simulations, we certify these OTPs are almost independent. There are other advantages of our scheme. For examples, the calculation cost is low. The counter synchronization is easily operated by U . It needn't reset the original conditions of U and S. At the same time, our scheme can resist many attacks, such as Eavesdropping Attack, Replay Attack, Password Guessing Attacks, Masquerade/Impersonation Attack/Forgery Attack, Stolen-Verifier Attacks, Microcomputer Lost Attack, Small Challenge Attack and Repudiation Attack.
